empirical description of Palestinian labor market outcomes in recent years. Section III outlines a simple equilibrium model that describes how supply and demand for labor might interact to determine Palestinian wages and employment. Section IV presents estimates of key parameters in the model, and Section V discusses policy implications of the estimates. Section VI offers a summary and some conclusions.
II. Background, Data, and Descriptive Analysis
Official Israeli policy requires residents of the territories who want to work in Israel to apply for work through the Israeli Employment Service. The Employment Service then channels Palestinian workers to Israeli employers (Israel Employment Service 1991). The Employment Service is the only legal avenue through which Israelis may employ Palestinians, and the Palestinian payrolls of Israeli employers are supposed to be disbursed by the Employment Service. The Employment Service also deducts taxes, social insurance contributions, and union dues from these payrolls. Until recently, the Employment Service was also the only legal employment agency for most noncollege-educated Israeli citizens, and most job openings in Israel were posted through this agency (Berman 1994 Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the sample of men aged 18-64 by region of residence. Some 8,000-10,000 interviews were conducted each year in the Gaza Strip, and between 22,000 and 30,000 interviews were conducted each year in the West Bank. Because of the sample rotation scheme, only one-quarter of these observations are newly sampled in any given year. The sample sizes show that the number of completed interviews fell with the onset of the Palestinian uprising in 1988, especially in the Gaza Strip, where the uprising started earliest and was most intense.
The average age of men in the sample is 33, and the proportion married rose from 67% to 75% in the Gaza Strip and from 64% to 67% in the West Bank. Married men are probably overrepresented in the sample because the interviews of employed men are often completed by proxy respondents. The average level of schooling rose considerably over the sample period, from 7.6 years to 8.8 years in the Gaza Strip and from 7.7 years to 8.6 years in the West Bank. This is partly attributable to the large number of new college graduates who entered the labor force in the 1980s (Angrist 1995; Simon 1988) . The descriptive statistics also show a substantial increase in labor force participation, which is primarily a consequence of increased participation by men aged 18-24. 6 Absentees are defined as labor force participants who did not work, assist on a farm or family business, or actively seek work during the reference week who reported that they had a job, farm, or agricultural position from which they were absent (for any reason). (Angrist 1995 ) I discuss the possibility that shifts in the supply of educated workers were a major contributing factor in the decline in returns to schooling. Angrist (1992) also shows that workers with different characteristics were employed in Israel at different times, which suggests that changes in the Israeli wage premium and schooling coefficients may reflect worker heterogeneity. But a set of estimates using panel data show that both of these changes exist even after allowing for individual heterogeneity.
B. Employment Patterns
The industry wage effects in columns 4-7 indicate that in the beginning of the sample period agricultural workers earned least while construction workers earned most. By 1988, however, workers in agriculture were no longer paid less than those in the reference group (public and community services). By 1989, agricultural workers earned more than workers in the general service sector and in the manufacturing sector. The premium paid to construction workers also grew to almost 20%/ by 1988, while the wage gap between construction and agriculture shrank from roughly 30%/a to l5%/l. The wage gap between manufacturing and construction was fairly stable at roughly 15%o. The growth in relative Separate regressions for men employed in agriculture, construction, and manufacturing also show a negative covariance between days worked and average daily wages, even after controlling for wages earned by Israeli citizens (except for manufacturing workers). For example, the coefficient in a regression of log average daily wages paid to construction workers on their days of work is -0.16. Note that, for each industry group, wages paid to Palestinians working in Israel are strongly positively correlated with the wages paid to Israeli citizens working in those industries. This suggests that some of the movement in Palestinian wages reflects an Israeli trend or demand shock and highlights the importance of isolating a source of exogenous variation in labor supply that can be used to identify structural demand parameters.
III. Theoretical Framework
This section develops a theoretical framework that can be used to interpret the effect of exogenous supply shocks on Palestinian wages and 9 Data on the wages of Israeli citizens were derived from table R/3 in National Insurance Institute (1992, and selected earlier issues); see Angrist (1994) Workers employed locally produce ye, and workers employed in Israel produce yin. In both cases, the production function is assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale, with the following unit cost functions:
where xj is the price of a second Hicks composite input in each production function. Local demand for the local product, ye, is assumed to be a function of the wages paid in Israel and in the territories and the price of the local good, pe: The effect of shifts in exogenous variables on equilibrium wage rates can be obtained by substituting (7) into (5) and (5) The only implication of this change for equation (9) is that flex and lrmx must be redefined. The value of having both the curfew and disturbance data is that the IDF data on disturbances can provide a partial control for the local disruptions associated with incidents leading to curfews.
A. Measurement Framework
In addition to using the IDF disturbances data as a control variable, a variance components structure is introduced to allow for the fact that supply shocks like curfews and closures can appear in the demand equation or be associated with variables that have an effect on labor demand. Let Z, denote a vector of candidate instruments that might shift labor supply at either location (Z, includes zm, and ze in the notation of the previous section). The This assumption means that the elements of Zt can be bundled in a linear combination that captures all the demand shocks generated by Zt up to a factor of proportionality. Note that if Zt itself is a scalar, assumption I is not really a restriction. In practice, however, identification of structural parameters in the demand equations requires more than a single instrument.
To generate an estimating equation, the demand functions are assumed to be approximately log-linear, so that, when equation (10) Given one or more of assumptions 2a, 2b, or 2c, equation (13) is overwderxxifexf and subject to ?Artlak xaNdAt1orf USInM data.
Results using the Gaza Strip as a comparison region appear in the first five columns of table 4, and results using the West Bank as a comparison region are reported in columns 6-10. The results are reported as coefficients on the regressors in equation (13). The coefficient on log wages in the comparison region is an estimate of K, the coefficient on log days worked in Israel is an estimate of 1/flmm, the coefficient on days worked in the comparison region is an estimate of -K/hee, and the coefficient on log total per-capita earnings is an estimate of K4/flee. Below the estimates reported in each column, the implied elasticities (flmn, fiee, and A) are also reported.'6 Columns 1-2 report OLS and IV estimates for the Gaza Strip comparison under assumption 2a (that the income elasticity of product demand in the comparison region is zero). The OLS estimates are unlikely to have a structural interpretation, but they are reported for comparison purposes. In this case, the OLS estimate of the Israeli demand elasticity is positive, but the IV estimate is negative, though imprecisely estimated. Other IV estimates based on models using the Gaza Strip as a comparison region generate estimated Israeli demand elasticities between -.76 and -2.2, with local demand elasticities in a similar range. Estimates of the income elasticity of product demand suggest that declines in income do not generate large changes in product demand for the local industries employing wage-earners. Finally, the x2 goodness-of-fit statistics suggest that these models fit the data well.
As 
V. Policy Analysis
The empirical results from the previous section can be combined with the theoretical framework in Section III above to assess the possible impact of policies that reduce Palestinian access to the Israeli labor market. To illustrate the potential labor market effect of supply shifts, the general comparative statics relationship, (9), is applied to a simple numerical example. Suppose that half of the roughly 105,000 Palestinians who were regularly employed in Israel (including Jerusalem) before 1991 were unwilling or unable to come to work at current wage rates. This shift might 17 The notion that Gaza is a better comparison region is supported by Razin and Sadka (1993, p. 86) , who note that "the Intifada (in Gaza) disturbed mostly the work of Gaza's residents in Israel." Razin and Sadka also note that the local nonagricultural sector in Gaza was hardest hit by the uprising. Results not reported here suggest that estimates of equation (13) by industry fit the data on Gazan agricultural workers especially well. Finally, note that unless local product demand is highly income elastic, this dampening effect works for Israeli demand elasticities that are much larger in magnitude than -2.2 as well. However, the magnitude of any behavioral response depends partly on whether the relevant shock is viewed by workers and employers as permanent or temporary. The example in this section takes all elasticities as fixed, whereas economic theory suggests that the product market response to permanent income shocks should be larger than the response to transitory shocks. Similarly, long-run elasticities of labor demand are likely to be larger than short-run elasticities of labor demand in both Israel and the territories. 
B. Disturbances
The IDF compiles data on the number of Israeli citizens, local residents, and soldiers injured or killed each month in the territories, on the number of attacks by local residents on Israeli citizens and soldiers (with and without use of firearms), incidents of arson, Molotov cocktails thrown, grenade attacks, and the number of civil disturbances. Some of these data are published in Israel Defense Forces (1992). The detailed monthly series used here were provided by the IDF spokesman's office. The civil disturbances series includes a count of incidents of stone throwing, road blockades, tires set ablaze, and unruliness. These data do not count incidents involving firearms.
